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Abstract: 
This research article reports the results of a qualitative case 
study that correlates academic literature with five Industry 4.0 
cyber trends, seven cyber risk frameworks and two cyber risk 
models. While there is a strong interest in industry and 
academia to standardise existing cyber risk frameworks, 
models and methodologies, an attempt to combine these 
approaches has not been done until present. We apply the 
grounded theory approach to derive with integration criteria for 
the reviewed frameworks, models and methodologies. Then, 
we propose a new architecture for the integration of the 
reviewed frameworks, models and methodologies. We 
therefore advance the efforts of integrating standards and 
governance into Industry 4.0 and offer a better understanding 
of a holistic economic impact assessment model for IoT cyber 
risk.  
Keywords: Industry 4.0., Internet of Things, case study, cyber 
security framework 
1 Introduction  
The term Internet-of-Things (IoT) usually refers to network-
connected cyber-physical devices that can communicate and 
share data in different constraining environments. Such 
technologies often seriously increase safety risk and raise 
important ethical concerns. Integrating IoT devices and cyber 
security technology in the communications networks of critical 
infrastructure implies major ethical aspects that humans should 
be able to sense and understand, while benefiting of maximum 
possible levels of trust and privacy. 
This concern is represented by the need different IoT verticals 
have to develop reliable cyber security frameworks to prevent 
abuse from malicious interventions, including those originated 
by organised crime, terror organisations or state-sponsored 
aggressors. Companies that are interested in obtaining new 
revenue streams from such data will pursue innovative and 
cost-effective ways to comply with these new regulations. 
Analysis of the complete economic impact of data compromise 
would empower the communications network providers to 
create clear, rigorous, industry-accepted mechanisms to 
measure, control, analyse, distribute and manage critical data 
needed to develop, deploy and operate cost-effective cyber 
security for critical infrastructure. 
The aim of this research is to provoke a debate among 
practitioners and academics by offering new design principles 
for assessing the cyber risk from IoT in the context of I4.0. The 
research undertakes a holistic investigation of the cyber risk of 
IoT in Industry 4.0 (I4.0). Our research approach combines 
qualitative data extracted from secondary sources. The 
research applies case study research to derive with new design 
principles for assessing the economic impact of IoT cyber 
risks. We will work with five I4.0 cyber trends (IIC, DCMS, 
IVI, Industrie 4.0., NTI,), seven cyber risk frameworks (FAIR, 
CMMI, CVSS, ISO, NIST, Octave and TARA) and two cyber 
risk models (RiskLense and Cyber VaR). This promotes the 
adaptation of existing models and methodologies by presenting 
the strengths and weaknesses of the frameworks and models. 
Secondly, we conduct a comprehensive literature review, 
focused on the way an increase in cyber security in IoT systems 
can minimise safety and security concerns and increase 
reliability, ethical acceptability and trust in this space. The 
documented process represents the design principles for 
mapping and optimising IoT cyber security and assessing its 
associated economic impact.  
The new design principles reported here have two objectives. 
The first objective is to enable a quick and up-to-date overview 
of existing and emerging IoT advancements in the field of 
Industry 4.0 (I4.0), which includes cyber-physical systems, the 
Internet of things, cloud computing and cognitive computing 
[1]–[3]. The second objective is to capture and enable the 
adaptation of the best cyber security practices in industry.  
1.1 Research plan 
In Section 2 we present the research methodology. In Section 
3 we propose the design principles by considering case studies 
of the main Industry 4.0 trends, cyber security frameworks and 
two cyber security quantitative models. In Section 4 we present 
the design principles for assessing the cyber risk of IoT in 
Industry 4.0. In Section 5 we discuss the new principles. In 
Section 6 we present the conclusions of the research.  
2 Research methodology  
The methods applied in this study consist of literature review 
and case study research. We use practical studies of major 
projects in the I4.0 to showcase recent developments of IoT 
systems in the I4.0 context.  We need practical studies to bridge 
the gaps and overcome some of the limitations and to construct 
the relationship between IoT and I4.0. The design principles 
[4]–[10]support the process of building a holistic IoT cyber 
risk impact assessment model. 
3 Development of design principles  
The design initiates with integrating best practices from the 
case analysis. To our knowledge, this represents the first I4.0 
attempt to integrate the academic literature with I4.0 practical 
initiatives applied globally. The integration of existing models 
with case study of I4.0 national initiatives leads to a new set of 
techniques, such as comparison of the national initiatives in 
I4.0 in terms of cyber risk focus. These techniques imply 
contrasting national policies and efforts towards 
standardisation, which are not discussed in the existing 
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literature. Therefore, we discuss the I4.0 initiatives in the 
context of major efforts in standards and governance (e.g. 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and 
Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR).  
To map the evolution of Internet of Things (IoT) and its 
associated cyber risks for the Industry 4.0 sector, we correlate 
seven cyber risk frameworks with I4.0 cyber trends. These 
frameworks are: FAIR, CMMI, CVSS, ISO, NIST, Octave and 
TARA. The stated seven frameworks are related to assessing 
general cyber risks. The new approach aims to identify the 
related aspects of IoT cyber risks. We compare existing cyber 
security measures and standards (e.g. FAIR and NIST cyber 
security frameworks) to propose a new and improved design 
principles for calculating the economic impact of IoT cyber 
risk.  
3.1 Understanding IoT in Industry 4.0 
initiatives 
The Industrial Internet Consortium [11], [12] promotes a fully 
connected and automated production line that brings the 
customer into the production process as a decision-maker, with 
the ability to adjust their preferences at the time of production. 
In addition, IIC supports highly automated (rules engines, 
protective overrides) and human operated (visualisation, 
intervention controls) usage environments. The IIC promotes 
Cloud-computing platforms and disaster recovery plans. 
However, disaster recovery plans are only mentioned once in a 
diagram, with no explanation on details or how it would be 
executed. Simply mentioning recovery planning, does not by 
default address the issue of having recovery planning in place.  
The most recent UK report by Department for Culture, Media 
and Sport [13] focuses extensively on the cloud integration in 
I4.0. However, while some initiatives are supported with direct 
examples of how the strategy can be executed (e.g. cloud data 
centres from Amazon, IBM, and Microsoft; or the cloud skills 
initiative to train public service in digital skills and assure the 
development of larger cloud technology skills), other 
initiatives are not well defined. This could in some instances 
be beneficial, as loosely defined standards provide flexibility 
in evolving as requirements change. Nevertheless, practical 
implementations (see Table 1) show that a concrete area of 
focus is required for the integration of IoT in I4.0.  
In addition, the DCMS [13] refers to digital real-time 
interoperable records for healthcare, and developing a real-
time platform for sharing information on missing persons and 
suspects. This report on the UK digital industry covers the 
aspects of autonomous cognitive decisions in great detail, 
listing specific projects, programs and funding sources (listed 
in Table 1), but does not mention real-time CPS-IoT platforms 
for I4.0. The main area of concern for the DCMS (2016), is that 
it does not provide guidance on recovery planning. The report 
is strongly focused on Active Cyber Defence and General Data 
Protection of customer data, but ignores other key risks, such 
as risks of unexpected failure for which recovery planning is 
crucial as such failures cannot be anticipated in advance.  
The recent Industrial Value Chain Initiative [14], [15] does not 
report concrete plans for real-time embedded systems or 
recovery plans. The German initiative; Industrie 4.0 [16] 
promotes cloud computing integration with the Internet of 
Services, and proposes cloud-based security networks, but fails 
to state recovery plans. The NIT initiative [17] represents a 
rather long-term forecasting for IoT and I4.0 and focuses on 
market network creations. This initiative contributes with new 
insights to I4.0 by arguing that market creation for new 
technologies is the key to the future businesses and supply 
chain integration in I4.0. However, the NIT forecasting does 
not assess the issues of real-time cloud networks, and critically, 
does not provide suggestions for recovery planning 
mechanisms.   
 
IoT in I4.0 
I4.0 cyber 
trends 
IoT Cloud in 
I4.0 
Real-time IoT in 
I4.0 
Autonomous 
cognitive IoT in 
I4.0 
Recovery 
plans for IoT 
in I4.0 
IoT cyber elements for I4.0 
IIC, 2016 Cloud-
computing 
platforms. 
Adapt 
businesses and 
operational 
models in real 
time; 
Customised 
product offers 
and marketing 
in real time. 
Fully connected 
and automated 
production line;  
Support highly 
automated 
environments.  
Disaster 
recovery.  
DCMS, 
2016 
Cloud 
technology 
skills; 
Cloud 
computing 
technologies; 
Cloud data 
centres; 
Cloud-based 
software; 
Cloud-based 
computing; 
Cloud 
guidance.   
Digital real-time 
and 
interoperable 
records; 
Platform for 
real-time 
information.  
 
UK Robotics and 
Autonomous 
Systems; 
Support for 
robotics and 
artificial 
intelligence; 
Encourage 
automation of 
industrial 
processes; 
Active Cyber 
Defence. 
Not 
discussed  
IVI, 2017 Cloud enabled 
monitoring; 
Integration 
framework in 
cloud 
computing. 
Not discussed Factory 
Automation 
Suppliers and IT 
vendors; 
Utilisation of 
Robot Program 
Assets by CPS.s 
Not 
discussed 
Industrie 
4.0, 2013 
CPS 
automated 
systems; 
Automated 
conservation 
of resources.   
Cloud 
computing; 
Cloud-based 
security 
networks. 
 
Automated 
production; 
Automated 
conservation of 
recourses.  
Not 
discussed 
NTI, 2015 Not discussed Not discussed Artificial 
intelligence and 
control systems   
Not 
discussed 
Table 1: IoT in I4.0 cyber trends 
3.2 Conclusions from the case study of I4.0 
initiatives 
Research shows that global sharing of existing innovation 
testbeds (22 US testbeds from IIC; 11 UK catapults; over 500 
projects in Germany), would reduce cost and enable faster 
product to market process. Global sharing is also needed for 
the IoT key markets, bringing into focus the G20 initiative 
policy key point for trade liberalisation [18]. The second policy 
of the G20 initiative (the elimination of subsidies) is somewhat 
confusing. While there is a compelling argument for the 
elimination of subsidies in the traditional industries, the 
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concept of I4.0 requires technologies that are still in the infant 
stage of research and development. Economic policy dictates 
that infant industries need state support, hence emerging digital 
technologies also require state support. On the other hand, the 
NTI guiding principle [17] for focusing on market 
development is designed to reduce substantially any financial 
involvement of the state. The NTI policy approach would 
address the second G20 policy key point ‘the elimination of 
subsidies’ [18]. The most concerning finding from the case 
study is the lack of clarity on disaster recovery plans. Recovery 
planning is somewhat blurred and this is of concern as in the 
literature the recovery planning is strongly emphasised. 
3.3 Reflecting on cyber risk standards and 
cyber risk models  
A key part of understanding the risks and issues facing the IoT 
and I4.0 involves reflecting on the standards and models 
present today [10], [19]–[32]. In what follows, we reflect on 
seven cyber risk standards and two cyber risk models. 
The Factor Analysis of Information Risk [33] promotes a 
standard quantitative risk model for information security and 
operational risk. In practice, FAIR represents a framework for 
understanding, measuring and analysing information risk in 
financial terms. The FAIR model is complementary to existing 
risk frameworks and applies knowledge from existing 
quantitative models, such as RiskLens [34], and Cyber VaR 
[35].  
Next,  the Capability Maturity Model Integrated (CMMI) [36] 
is examined. CMMI  integrates five levels of the original 
Capability Maturity Model (CMM) [37]. However, this model 
does not provide guidance on disaster and recovery planning.  
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [38] 
provides ‘Modified Base Metrics’ for assigning metric values 
to real vulnerabilities. The ‘Modified Base Metrics’ represent 
a severity group (low, medium, high, critical), associated with 
a mathematical approximation of metric combinations ranked 
in order of severity. CVSS works on assembling standards, 
guidelines, and practices that are working effectively in 
industry.  
The International Organisation for Standardisation [39] is an 
international standard-setting body. The ISO 27032 is a 
framework for collaboration that provides specific 
recommendations for cyber security. ISO 27001 sets 
requirements for organisations to establish an Information 
Security Management System (ISMS). Notable for this 
discussion, ISO 27031 provides recommendations for disaster 
recovery. The other frameworks (in Table 2) and the cyber risk 
models (Table 3) should integrate the conclusions from the ISO 
framework.   
The National Institute of Standards and Technology’s [40] 
Cyber Security Framework (NIST, 2014) organises cyber 
security activities in five categories: Identify, Protect, Detect, 
Respond, and Recover. The recovery category differentiates 
this framework from all other frameworks. The NIST 
framework recognises the importance of recovery planning and 
suggest the development, implementation and maintenance of 
plans for timely recovering and restoring any capabilities or 
services that were impaired by a cyber-attack.  
Another approach is OCTAVE, which stands for Operationally 
Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation method 
[41]. This is a qualitative method for measuring cyber risk 
through workshops. The OCTAVE method recommends three 
levels of recovery (low, medium, high), but fails to provide a 
quantification method for calculating the required level of 
recovery. Hence, one way to regard OCTAVE is as a guide for 
researchers measuring cyber risks.  
The Threat Assessment & Remediation Analysis (TARA) [42] 
is a qualitative analytical model that applies threat matrix and 
standardised template to record system threats. TARA 
promotes and somewhat facilitates the identification of 
appropriate recovery options, but fails to quantify the impact 
of cyber risks, which is crucial for deciding on appropriate 
recovery planning.  
 
Risk 
Framew
orks: 
FAIR CMMI CVSS ISO NIST Octave TAR
A 
How to 
measure 
risk: 
Financial 
model 
Combine 
/integrate 
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Base 
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ISO 
27032  
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g risk 
Workshops Threat 
Matrix 
How to 
standardis
e risk: 
Compleme
ntary  
Reflected 
in ISO 
15504 - 
SPICE 
Mathemat
ical 
approxim
ation  
ISO 
27001  
Assembling 
standards, 
guidelines, 
and 
practices 
Encouraging 
institutionali
sation and 
repeatability 
Using 
standar
d 
templat
e to 
record 
system 
threats 
How to 
compute 
risk: 
Quantitativ
e 
Staged 
represent
ation 
with five 
maturity 
levels 
Qualitativ
e Severity 
Rating 
Scale 
Compli
ance 
based 
Complianc
e based 
Guide and 
training - 
qualitative 
Qualita
tive 
analyti
cal 
Disaster 
and 
recovery 
planning:  
Acceptable 
level of 
exposure 
N/A N/A ISO 
27031  
Recovery 
Planning; 
Improveme
nts; and 
Communic
ations 
Recovery 
impact areas  
Promot
es and 
facilitat
es 
system 
recover
y  
 
Table 2: Leading Cyber Risk Frameworks 
3.4 Findings from the leading cyber risk 
frameworks 
Findings for the reviewed frameworks can be summarized as 
follows:  
• The FAIR promotes a quantitative, risk based, 
acceptable level of loss exposure. 
• The CMMI and CVSS do not discuss disaster and 
recovery planning.  
• The ISO promotes a standard for disaster recovery.  
• NIST is the most advanced framework in terms of 
disaster and recovery planning and it provides 
recommendations on recovery planning, 
improvements and communications.  
• The OCTAVE developed a standardised questionnaire 
to investigate and categorise recovery impact areas.  
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• TARA promotes and facilitates system recovery, but 
does not provide a detailed methodology for disaster 
and recovery planning.  
Beyond these issues, research has highlighted other challenges 
in adopting existing cyber risk frameworks for dynamic and 
connected systems, where the IoT presents great complexities 
For example the the high degrees of connectivity in coupling 
of digital, cyber-physical, and social systems [43]. 
3.5 Comparing two Quantitative Risk Models 
– RiskLens and Cyber VaR 
The two cyber risk assessment models promoted by the World 
Economic Forum (Cyber VaR) and the FAIR institute 
(RiskLense) are analysed to compare the similarities and 
differences. The two approaches are selected for comparison 
because both are promoted as a standardised quantitative 
reference models for assessing cyber risks. 
 
Quantitative 
Risk Models: 
RiskLens       Cyber VaR 
How to measure 
risk: 
BetaPERT distributions VaR 
How to 
standardise risk: 
Adopt FAIR  World Economic 
Forum 
How to compute 
risk: 
Quantitative risk analytics with Monte 
Carlo and sensitivity analysis 
Quantitative risk 
analytics with 
Monte Carlo 
Disaster and 
recovery 
planning:  
Not included Not included 
Table 3: Quantitative Cyber Risk Models 
The main difference between the two models is that RiskLense 
uses BetaPERT distributions [34] and the Cyber VaR is based 
on the Value at Risk model [35], [44]–[46]. Both models use 
Monte Carlo simulations for assessing cyber risk with minimal 
data sets, and both models are focused on loss exposure, loss 
event frequency and vulnerability. The two models do not 
assess the precise cost of recovery, but for the cyber insurance 
purposes, the loss exposure and loss event frequency can be 
used to calculate the potential cost of recovery. 
4 Proposed design principles 
We propose a new set of design principles for assessing the 
cyber risk from IoT integration into I4.0. The principles 
derived from the qualitative case study. The case study of IoT 
in I4.0 (Table 1) shows that I4.0 trends have failed to 
implement the recovery planning in the leading national 
initiatives. This is in contradiction with the findings from the 
second reflection of the leading cyber risk frameworks (Table 
2), where the recovery planning is strongly emphasised (see: 
ISO, FAIR, NIST, Octave, TARA). It seems that the leading 
national I4.0 initiatives have ignored the recommendations 
from the world leading cyber risk frameworks. A new model 
for IoT in I4.0 should firstly consider the findings from the I4.0 
trends, secondly the recommendations from the leading cyber 
risk frameworks. To identify the cost of recovery planning or 
the cost of cyber insurance, a new quantitative model is needed 
that would be applicable to IoT cyber risks. 
There are currently two leading quantitative cyber risk models. 
First is the RiskLens approach, promoted by FAIR. Second is 
the Cyber VaR, promoted by the World Economic Forum, 
Deloitte and more recently by FAIR. The unifying link 
between the two cyber risk models is the application of Monte 
Carlo simulations for predicting cyber risk uncertainty.        
 
 
Figure 1: Design principles for assessing IoT cyber risks in 
I4.0 
 
From the case study, it appears that a new impact assessment 
model for the cyber risks from IoT integration into I4.0, should 
start with the guidance from RiskLense and Cyber VaR. The 
application of Monte Carlo simulation would reduce the IoT 
cyber risk uncertainty and enable the approximation and 
estimation of the economic impact of cyber risk from IoT 
devices. Such calculation would enable companies to develop 
appropriate recovery planning and the insurance industry to 
provide a more realistic cost of cyber insurance.  
The proposed design principles suggest anticipating recovery 
planning in the assessment of economic impact of IoT cyber 
risk. Such approach would enable cyber insurance companies 
to value the impact of IoT cyber risks in I4.0. The rationale of 
the proposed design principles is that without appropriate 
recovery planning, the economic impact can be miscalculated, 
resulting in greater losses than we anticipated initially. The 
design principles in Figure 1 are developed to advance the 
existing efforts (from the World Economic Forum, Deloitte, 
FAIR, etc) in developing a standardised quantitative approach 
for assessing the impact of cyber risks.  
5 Discussion  
The lack of disaster and recovery planning is consistent in all 
the I4.0 initiatives reviewed. Adding to this, the new risks 
emerging from IoT connected devices and services, and the 
lack of economic impact assessments from IoT cyber risks, 
makes it imperative to emphasise the lack of recovery planning 
in the leading I4.0 initiatives. The volume of data generated by 
the IoT devices creates diverse challenges in variety of 
verticals (e.g. machine learning, ethics, business models). 
Simultaneously, to design and build cyber security architecture 
for complex coupled IoT systems, while understanding the 
economic impact, demands bold new solutions for 
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optimisation and decision making [43]. Much of the research 
is application-oriented and by default interdisciplinary, 
requiring hybrid research in different academic areas. This 
enabled the design of cyber security architectures that integrate 
economic impact assessment in IoT verticals, that meet public 
acceptability, security standards, and legal scrutiny.   
6 Conclusion  
This paper combines existing literature in order to derive 
common approaches and to incorporate existing standards. 
This result with mapping of the existing initiatives, 
frameworks and methods for assessing the impact of cyber risk 
This results with a new set of design principles supported with 
a new set of design criteria, specific for cyber risk from the IoT. 
The proposed design principles present recommendations for 
cyber security recovery improvements. The design principles 
enable the visualisation of IoT cyber risk and inform 
organisations in this space of best practices.  
The new design principles map interactions among different 
factors in the IoT devices, and derive new sets of cyber security 
assessment criteria. The design principles described here can 
be used for assessing the economic impact of IoT compromises 
and to make recommendations for IoT devices. The design 
principles are also relevant to national and international I4.0 
networks, specifically for building recovery planning.  
6.1 Areas for further research 
In order to design the proposed new impact assessment model, 
research should focus on: IoT economic impact, IoT machine 
ethics, IoT sensor networks, IoT safety, IoT cyber security and 
IoT equipment combined. The nature of such interdisciplinary 
research would benefit the advancements of smart city design, 
intelligent transport design, smart grid design and individual 
industries and services (e.g. commercial and industrial IoT 
equipment), by bridging gaps between cyber risk and economic 
value. The research will benefit the literature by integrating 
economic impact and cyber risk assessment models that have 
not been previously considered in combination. 
This work was supported by the UK EPSRC with project [grant 
number EP/N02334X/1 and EP/N023013/1] and by the Cisco 
Research Centre [grant number 2017-169701 (3696)]. 
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